____________________________________________________________________________________
American cases in the groundbreaking Nationwide News and ACTV cases 18 was not prompted by the historical influence of the United States Constitution. Citation of American authority occurred as part of a pattern of citing relevant foreign cases from many jurisdictions and stems from the fact that American freedom of expression jurisprudence occupies a position that is paramount in longevity and extensiveness. Similarly, when the implied freedom principle was applied to defamation issues, it was natural to cite American cases because The New York Times Co v Sullivan 19 was at the heart of extensive reconsideration of defamation law in many jurisdictions. 20 But when the implied freedom of political communication became firmly established in Australian constitutional law in Lange, 21 there is no easy explanation for the extraordinary place given to American constitutional law in the High Court's unanimous decision. 22 
B
Implied freedom of political communication: a brief summary Before turning directly to an attempt to unravel the High Court's use of American constitutional law in Lange, it is important to summarise the law solidified by the Lange judgment. The two original implied freedom cases did not command the full approval Technically and, as it turned out, crucially, they were actually 3-1-3 decisions. Deane J acquiesced in the answers of Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ to the specific questions reserved by the stated cases, but because his judgment advocated a far more speechprotective position, the High Court later, in 189 CLR 520, treated Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104 and Stephens (1994) 182 CLR 211 as lacking a majority position. This reasoning seemed 'rather disingenuous' to Professor Loveland in Ian Loveland, Political Libels (1999) 148: 'It is something of an exercise in sophistry to claim that because Deane J went far beyond the point reached by the plurality he cannot be assumed to have approved their destination'. Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 566-7. Yet the Court also said that, 'to have a full understanding of the concept of representative government' (at 559), it is necessary to heed the words of A H Birch, Representative and Responsible Government (1964) 17, that elections must be free 'with all that this implies in the way of freedom of speech …'. Birch was certainly not relying on the text of the Australian Constitution or any particular text. extent that the text and structure of the Constitution establish it.' 33 Professor Leslie Zines has expressed his doubts about the significance for the future of the freedom of political communication of this text-and-structure limitation. 34 2 Scope. Chief Justice Mason's judgment in ACTV spoke of 'freedom of communication, at least in relation to public affairs and political discussion' and he queried whether such 'discussion is substantially different from an unlimited freedom of communication.' 35 Despite these whisps of a broader free speech protection, the High Court has been united since 1992 in regarding the newly recognised speech protection as applicable only to 'political' communication, in this respect true to its Meiklejohnian kinship. 36 Within that political limitation, the implied freedom was given a broad scope in the Lange decision. 37 The freedom encompasses relevant information concerning the functioning of government and about the policies of political parties and candidates; communications between electors and the elected representatives, between the electors and candidates for election, between the electors themselves; communications concerning the conduct of executive branch officials, including ministers, the public service, statutory authorities and utilities. 38 Although national democratic elections provide the basis for the implication, the protection of relevant communications is not confined to the election period. 39 There remains some uncertainty about the applicability of the implied freedom to communications related to political matters below 40 or beyond 41 the national level. 38 189 CLR 520, 560-1. 39 Ibid 557-8, 561-2. 40 Compare Stephens (1994) 182 CLR 211, 232 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 257 (Deane J), with Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 ('Levy'), 595-6 (Brennan CJ, denying such applicability but conceding a contrary majority in Stephens). In a recent decision, the Court came close but did not resolve the question: Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 involved a State statute prohibiting insulting words spoken to a State police officer. Noting that the State conceded the applicability of the constitutional freedom to communications concerning State political matters, McHugh J stated that the concession was proper because such officers enforce federal as well as State law: at 44-5. Gummow and Hayne JJ acknowledged that there was force in McHugh's reasoning but relied solely on the concession without deciding its correctness: at 78. Justice Kirby did not rely on the concession but agreed with McHugh J that the State statute as applied to State police was within the constitutional freedom: at 89. See also Callinan J at 112-13 (disagreeing with concession); and Heydon J at 120 (assuming without deciding that the State statutory prohibition burdened the constitutional freedom). 41 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 571-2. See Walker, above n 28, 181. 3
The Test. Even within the limits of political communication, the implied freedom of political communication has never been an absolute. 42 Despite variations articulated by various Justices both before and after Lange, 43 the test laid down by the unanimous Lange Court has been consistently accepted as setting the limits of the implied freedom. 44 The Lange test contains an end (or object) dimension and a means (or fit) dimension. 45 To satisfy the test, the means (or fit) dimension must be reasonably appropriate and adapted 46 to achieving the legitimate object (or end). The object (or end) part of the test was stated as follows:
The object of the law [which is claimed to violate the implied freedom of political communication] is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government [or the procedure by which the people vote on a constitutional amendment]. 47 The verbal formula was revised slightly in Coleman v Power. 48 Actually, the meansand-end two parts are sometimes treated as one element and a further element is added as a kind of preliminary requirement: Does the challenged law 'effectively burden freedom of communication about government or political matters either in its terms, operation or effect.' 49 freedom, on how much impairment of the freedom has occurred, and how much impairment will be sufficient to be regarded as an effective 'burden'.
Notwithstanding the unanimous Lange judgment and the subsequent acceptance of this test as controlling, its application has not always commanded agreement on just how tight a fit is required to justify restrictions on political communication to further permissible government objectives. For example, Lange required that a challenged law (limiting the freedom of political communication) 'is' reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieve the state's permissible object; but, in his contemporaneous Levy judgment, Brennan CJ proposed a more deferential standard, requiring only that the challenged law could 'reasonably be considered to be' appropriate and adapted to achieving the object. 50 The deferential standard was eventually rejected in Coleman. 51 In a related but distinct example, the Lange decision illustrated the means part of the test by noting that the majority decision in ACTV had found that 'a law seriously impeding discussion during the course of a federal election was invalid because there were other less drastic means by which the objectives of the law could be achieved.' 52 In Levy, however, Brennan CJ said that Australian courts lacked power to determine that 'some more limited restriction … could suffice to achieve a legitimate purpose.' 53
II THE COMMON LAW AND TWO CONSTITUTIONS
Just as the Lange judgment was undertaking to settle the rationale, scope, and test for the judicially developed implied freedom of political communication, it was opening new questions about the meaning and future application of that freedom when the constitutional challenge related to the common law. The new ground being broken came primarily in a kind of essay which the High Court labelled 'The common law and the Constitution'. This jurisprudential essay embedded in the Lange judgment -sort of a play within the play -is at once fascinating and baffling, though perhaps baffling only to American eyes. The Court never explicitly explained why it inserted this essay (hereinafter sometimes 'the Essay' or 'the Lange Essay') at just this point in its judgment and what it is intended to accomplish. Read in the context of the entire judgment, however, the purpose is clear. In Theophanous, a three-Justice plurality had said, '[i]f the Constitution … is at variance with a doctrine of the common law, the latter must yield to the former.' 54 In Lange, a unanimous Court said 'the common law rules of defamation must conform to the requirements of the Constitution.' 55 In the Lange Essay, the Court is explaining why it is shifting from the Theophanous approach, under which inconsistent common law 'yields' to the Constitution, to the Lange approach, under 
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The Essay begins with a simple observation that defamed persons must find a legal remedy 'either in the common law or in a statute 56 which confers a right of action.' The Court then adds, it 'cannot be admitted' that a remedy would be available if its exercise infringed the constitutionally protected freedom of political communication. To an American eye, and perhaps to an Australian eye immediately after Theophanous and Stephens, that seems a pretty straightforward proposition: Usually, defamatory speech results in liability against the defamer, but under some circumstances the Constitution protects the defaming speaker. Within that broad principle, it is a matter of working out the contours of the limits resulting from the constitutional protection of some speech, which would otherwise be an actionable defamation. That is what NY Times and, in Australia, Theophanous and Stephens were all about. 57 But, to the Lange Court, the proposition is not straightforward. An explanation is required. Having asserted that it 'cannot be admitted' that a defamation remedy could be given at the expense of the constitutional freedom, the Court concludes, '[i]t is necessary, therefore, to consider the relationship between the Constitution and the freedom of communication … on the one hand and the common law and statute law … of defamation on the other.' 58 Beginning this consideration at the beginning, the Court starts with the Parliament at Westminster, the United Kingdom's 'unwritten constitution', and the fact that the 'common law supplies elements of the British constitutional fabric.' 59 The Court draws upon the words of Sir Owen Dixon for this last point and for the proposition that parliamentary sovereignty is not part of some inherent law of nations, but a part of 'the common law of England'. 60 The Lange Essay then follows this history to Australia to consider the impact on the common law framework of a 'federal system of government embodied in a written and rigid constitution.' 61 Remarkably, however, the Essay is suddenly not talking only about an accommodation of the common law to Australia's written federal constitution, but also to 'that of the United States of America'. 62 The full statement is: 'With the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia, as with that of the United States of America, it became necessary to accommodate basic common law concepts and techniques to a federal system of government embodied in a written and rigid constitution.' 63 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 56 Naming this section 'The Common Law and the Constitution' identifies the focus of the Court's attention, but the need for accuracy requires frequent references to the relationship between statutes and the Constitution; and the tension between the common law emphasis and the unavoidable discussion of statutes reveals that the message of the Essay is more complicated than it first appears to be. Having drawn the parallel, the Court then brings out a contrast. 'The outcome [of this accommodation] in Australia differs from that in the United States.' 64 The Essay then summarises in two sentences the difference in the way the two federal systems have incorporated and accommodated the common law:
There is but one common law in Australia which is declared by this Court as the final court of appeal. In contrast to the position in the United States, the common law as it exists throughout the Australian States and Territories is not fragmented into different systems of jurisprudence, possessing different content and subject to different authoritative interpretations. 65 The Court then states, 'The distinction is important for the present case and may be illustrated as follows.' 66 What is to be 'illustrated' in the remaining discussion in the Essay is somewhat elusive. Literally, the reference is to 'the distinction', which evidently refers to the differing 'outcomes' produced by the intersection of the common law with the Australian and American federal constitutional systems. In context, the thing to be illustrated in what 'follows' is the importance of the American-Australian differences in explaining the relationship between the common law and the Constitution in Australia. That, more specifically, must mean the insight that comes from analysing the different ways that Australia and the United States have accommodated 'common law concepts and techniques' to a 'written and rigid constitution' which embodies a federal system of government. 67 Of course, Australian constitutional law has no obligation to explain why it is different from American constitutional law. Nevertheless, the High Court seems to be saying that comparing and contrasting Australian and American constitutional law is an indispensable tool in the Court's explanation of the relationship between the common law and the Constitution in Australia; or, at the very least, that knowing that the United States and Australia faced a similar problem and solved it differently should contribute significantly to an understanding of the relationship. 68 Having undertaken to do so in the Essay which 'follows', the reasons explaining why the Australian and United States federal Constitutions have produced different approaches to the relationship between the common law of defamation and the constitutional freedom of expression should be clear and important. It is questionable whether that standard has been met.
In the Essay's discussion of 'The Common Law and the Constitution', it is possible to identify three (different but overlapping) dimensions which the High Court offers to explain why the American fragmented federal system and the Australian unitary federal system require different approaches to resolving the possible conflict between common law defamation and constitutionally protected freedom of political _____________________________________________________________________________________ 64 Ibid 563. 65 Ibid.
66
Ibid. 67 Ibid 562. communication: (1) whether the federal judiciary has power to decide the meaning of the common law; (2) whether the source of recovery for injury resulting from constitutional violations is to be found in the common law or the Constitution; and (3) whether the character of the implied constitutional freedom is a limit on government power or a source of a personal right.
A
The common law and two systems of federalism The fundamental contrast emphasised in the Essay is between 'one common law in Australia … declared by this Court as the final court of appeal' and the fragmentation of the common law in the United States 'into different systems of jurisprudence, possessing different content and subject to different authoritative interpretations'. 69 This contrast identifies two kinds of fragmentation and two different contrasts. First, there is the fragmentation of the content of the common law in the United States into 50 different laws for 50 different states. Whether based on the common law of defamation or statutory enactments codifying and modifying that law, each of the American states has its own law of defamation. That does not mean, inevitably, 50 different legal rules on every conceivable aspect of defamation law. On the contrary, there is a great deal of similarity of the law from one state to the next; 70 but each state law is separate and autonomous. There is no general federal common law, 71 and therefore no federal common law of defamation.
The second kind of fragmentation in American common law concerns judicial power -what the Lange Essay means by being 'subject to different authoritative interpretations'. In the United States, federal courts at all levels have ultimate authority to decide the meaning only of federal law; they have no judicial power to provide the authoritative interpretation of state defamation law or any other state law. 72 That applies to the Supreme Court of the United States as well. So, in short, in the United States, the Supreme Court has no general common law jurisdiction, 73 and so no jurisdiction over the common law of defamation; at the same time, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to determine the meaning of state law of any kind, and so no jurisdiction whatsoever over the states' defamation law.
The contrast, in both respects, is clear and large. The Australian High Court is truly a 'high' court for all purposes: As the Essay states, it is 'the final court of appeal' with the last word on the common law, and it also has the last word on every other legal issue -whether based on common law, statute law, or constitutional law; whether a law of the Commonwealth or one of the Australian States. As a consequence of this difference in judicial power, the highest court in Australia has a string to its bow that the highest American court does not have: When a collision between the common law When state law questions come before any federal court in the United States in so-called 'diversity' cases, the court decides those questions on the basis of state law as determined by a state court: see ibid 470-2. 73 But see below, nn 184-205 and accompanying text (discussing common law methodology for interpreting constitutional law).
of defamation and the Australian Constitution is threatened, the High Court of Australia can prevent the conflict by its interpretation of the common law, 'which it is the duty of the courts to ascertain as best they may'. 74 The United States Supreme Court can resolve such a conflict only by saying, in effect, 'We accept the fact that the common law in State X means thus and so (because that is what the State X Supreme Court says it means)' and then adding, 'That is unfortunate because the common law so interpreted by the State X Supreme Court is unconstitutional and has to yield to the United States Constitution.' 75 There is certainly a distinction here: In the United States (and Australia under Theophanous), the common law and the Constitution are not brought into harmony. The Constitution requires a certain level of protection of free speech, but the common law defences to a defamation action may require less free speech protection. When that happens in the United States, the common law, like any other law, is unenforceable insofar as it gives an action for damages that violates the United States Constitution. In Australia after Lange, the common law may require more but it may not require something less than the Constitution. That form of disharmony is prevented from occurring by the obligation of the courts to develop the common law to bring it into harmony with the Australian Constitution. 76 Fundamental as this distinction is, 77 the question remains whether the distinction is 'important' in explaining the abandonment of the Theophanous (and American) approach in favor of the Lange approach. A majority of the High Court in Theophanous did not adopt the American approach because it was American, but because the majority of High Court Justices thought it was a sound approach under the thenevolving Australian constitutional law. Suppose the Lange case had been decided first, squarely based, as it was, on the judicially developed common law deliberately brought into accord with the Constitution. Suppose it was then argued in an American court that the Australian approach should be adopted. The clear answer would be that that is impossible: under American constitutional law, federal courts have no power to shape the common law.
But the situations are not reciprocal. The fact that the Australian courts do have that power to shape the common law does not translate into their lacking the power to create a constitutional defence to what would otherwise be a valid common law action for defamation damages. Indeed, the Lange judgment makes it clear that such a defence would be available if the defamation action were based on a statute which failed to pass the Court's two-part test. 78 Australia's brand of federalism makes it possible to choose the common law approach adopted in Lange, but it does not preclude the approach the High Court had adopted in Theophanous.
The Lange Essay opined that 'it makes little sense in Australia to adopt the United States doctrine so as to identify litigation between private parties over their common law rights and liabilities as involving "State law rights".' 79 Perhaps the Lange Court was correct to say that it 'makes little sense' for Australia to eschew an option that it has. But to say that 'it makes little sense' to take a particular approach falls short of saying that that approach is not available or that the decision to forego the alternative approach of NY Times and Theophanous is compelled by the difference between American fragmented federalism and Australian unitary federalism. Nor does it appear that there is any difference of substance between the two approaches that would clearly warrant a characterisation of the difference as 'important'. Under either approach, the same result (reconciliation of competing common law reputational interest and constitutional expressive interest) by the same general means (subordinating the common law reputational interest to the constitutional expressive interest under the circumstances) is reached in consideration of the same ingredients ('the common convenience and welfare of society' 80 ). Thus, it seems that the distinction is one of form, not substance, and thus it seems questionable whether one can characterise the distinction as an important one. 81 The High Court might have taken the position that it was simply applying the common law, which of course it was fully empowered to do. And, as long as the common law interpretation adopted by the Court contained a common law defence that covered the constitutionally protected freedom of political communication, the Rejecting a distinction between statutory laws abridging freedom of speech and common law abridgements, the Supreme Court of the United States said 'the test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised': NY Times, 376 US 254, 265 (1964).
question of a conflict between the law of defamation and the law of the Constitution would never arise. That is an approach that Dr Adrienne Stone has advocated. 82 Its appeal is that it avoids constitutional issues and constitutional decisions, at least initially, an advantage similar to that gained by reading a statute narrowly to avoid premature constitutional decisions. 83 Dr Stone's preference for a common law alternative is also supported by the incrementalism of the common law and the risk of overly ambitious constitutional results, 84 but that risk would be ameliorated if the High Court follows a common law methodology for constitutional decision making. 85 At some point, however, the common law -developed entirely independently of the Constitution -might fall short of what the Constitution requires (as the Court understood it did in Theophanous). A decision would then have to be made about the consequences. To say at that point that the Constitution does not apply to the common law would create different results for the same defamation rule in two different States depending on the source of the rule in the common law or a statute. That would be a very unappealing solution. Alternatively, without confronting the question of a common law-constitutional law collision, the Court could always avoid a conflict by manipulating the common law to fit the Constitution but without acknowledging the manipulation -perhaps not even to itself. In these circumstances, the legislature, without judicial guidance, might feel free to modify the common law rule only to find that it had enacted a statute that was unconstitutional under the Lange test. 86 Perhaps the High Court's qualified way of speaking about the road not taken ('it makes little sense' to adopt the American approach) simply reflects the fact that that road will never be open in view of the approach that Lange adopts. If the courts are always required to make the common law conform to the Constitution, there can never be a situation in which a constitutional defence to a common law action will be needed. But, of course, the reason for closing the alternative route cannot be constructed on the ground that the alternative route has been closed. Lange is taken as having rejected the Theophanous and Stephens (and American) approach. 87 Nothing in the Essay -nor elsewhere in the Lange judgment -indicates that the Theophanous-Stephens approach was rejected, except the ultimate conclusion that the defence based on the theory of those cases is 'bad in law'. 88 No reason for that rejection is given except the weak and obliquely stated reason that another approach is available. 
B
Sources of remedy for constitutional violations Plainly, the American and Australian federal constitutional systems have assimilated the antecedent common law differently. That difference demonstrates that Australia can adopt the common law approach of Lange, but it falls short of providing a satisfying explanation for rejecting Theophanous. In fact, the Lange Essay does not rest with that explanation, but goes on to discuss other Australian-American differences. Perhaps the Court's further discussion can supplement and strengthen the first possible explanation or independently explain the rejection of the Theophanous approach. One such possibility is the Essay's discussion of the different sources of remedies for constitutional violations. The Essay stressed this aspect of the AustralianAmerican difference in one short paragraph: 89 This constitutional classification 90 has also been used in the United States to support the existence of a federal action for damages arising from certain executive action in violation of 'free-standing' constitutional rights, privileges or immunities [citing the Bivens case 91 ]. On the other hand, in Australia, recovery of loss arising from conduct in excess of constitutional authority has been dealt with under the rubric of the common law, particularly the law of tort [citing the Mengel case 92 ].
At first blush, this paragraph seems very promising. In a judgment, and specifically in an Essay within that judgment, that undertakes to explain the course of Australian constitutional law by highlighting the way it is similar to but different from American constitutional law, this paragraph identifies an apparently stark contrast: On the one hand, 'recovery of loss … under the rubric of the common law' and, on the other hand, under a '"free-standing" constitutional right'. The apparent difference is all the sharper in light of the fact that, in Mengel, the High Court expressly rejected the Australian Constitution as an independent source of a damage action against government officials. Best of all, it would seem, here is a difference on the basis of which Australia comes down on the side of a common law solution, the United States on the side of a constitutional solution.
But the paragraph, at least directly, is not a part of any line of argument that is further developed in Lange. It is almost an aside -a kind of tangential observation about the 'interaction … between the United States Constitution and the State common laws.' 93 Why talk about the source of damage actions at all? Neither the Lange case nor any of its free speech-defamation predecessors, any of the American free speechdefamation cases or, for that matter, any of the High Court's political communication cases involved an action for damages by the party relying on the freedom of political communication against a government or against anyone else. Defamation actions, generally, do not involve claims for damages by defendants who are relying on their freedom to speak. They do often involve what amounts to an 'immunity' from a liability _____________________________________________________________________________________ 89 Ibid 563. 90 The reference to this 'constitutional classification' is not altogether clear. It seems most likely to refer to 'a constitutional privilege', referred to in the immediately preceding sentence, but it could refer more broadly to the First Amendment, from which the words 'the freedom of speech, or of the press' are quoted earlier in the paragraph. Nothing seems to turn on resolving that ambiguity. that would otherwise exist because there is some special justification for speaking even though the speech is otherwise defamatory and actionable -precisely what they receive under American law and under Australian law, whether in the form of a constitutional ground for invalidating a statutory defamation action or in the form of a common law defence developed to conform to the Australian Constitution. 94 Where no other source is available, the United States Supreme Court reasoned in the Bivens case, an action for damages for a constitutional violation by a federal government official can be based on the United States Constitution itself. Bivens concerned a suit against federal agents who knowingly conducted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 95 The American Bivens case (like the Australian Mengel case) did not involve any form of freedom of expression. Although a Bivens action based on a violation of the First Amendment by a federal official would be possible, few such actions have ever been brought and none has ever been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. 96 In the United States, constitutional violations by state or local officials would be far more common, and actions based on such violations would not be brought under Bivens, but under a federal statute. 97 Such statutory actions are commonly analogised to common law tort actions. 98 In the Mengel Case, the High Court rejected a claimed constitutional violation, failure to comply with the 'rule of law', as a basis of liability. Although government actions in violation of free expression can cause injury (for example, denying a government job to someone because she advocated the election of a disfavoured candidate), claims based on the freedom of expression are characteristically defensive -to avoid civil or criminal liability that would otherwise arise, as the relatively few Australian cases demonstrate. 
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Volume 34 ____________________________________________________________________________________ commerce among the States. 101 Distinguishing an earlier case, Dixon J (as he then was) explained that section 92 gives an immunity from an exercise of government power but considered that, as a basis for an action for damages, it 'will do no more than nullify an alleged justification of the government's exercise of a purported power.' 102 The Justices speaking for the Court in Mengel explained that liability of government and government officials in Australia was available on the same basis as an action between two private persons. Violation of a constitutional provision might be relevant in determining that a government official acted negligently in failing to know the limits of his authority, but it added little or nothing to the basis of a damages action under the general law:
If it were the case that governments and public officers were not liable in negligence, or that they were not subject to the same general principles that apply to individuals, there would be something to be said for extending misfeasance in public office to cover acts which a public officer ought to know are beyond his or her power and which involve a foreseeable risk of harm. 103 At the end of the day, the magnitude and nature and relevance of the Bivens-Mengel distinction seems doubtful. Indeed, the High Court in Mengel suggested in the language just quoted that Australia might forge a comparable remedy if there were no available common law action.
Finally, putting all these other considerations to one side, the Bivens-Mengel dichotomy does not really speak to the question which the Lange Essay addresses: the different ways that the Australian and American federal systems have accommodated the common law. Whatever relevance Bivens could possibly have cannot be related to any distinction between Australian and American federalism. That point is nicely illustrated by Baigent's Case in New Zealand, 104 a country with no federal system at all. In Baigent, much like Bivens, police officers conducted a search in violation of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ). The New Zealand Court of Appeal drew heavily on Bivens in deciding that an action for damages would lie against police officers who conducted a search that was alleged to be in violation of New Zealand's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. 105 As Baigent demonstrates, the principle that constitutional violations should not go unremedied (a principle with which the Mengel Court indicated it was sympathetic) is a principle that might be adopted under any constitutional system, federal or unitary. It is also a principle that need not be adopted under any constitutional system. It has been narrowly applied in the United States. Recognising the constitutional freedom of political communication as a defence to a defamation action based on the communication, along the lines of the High Court's judgment in Theophanous, carries Unlike the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which has been interpreted to confer private rights, our Constitution contains no express right of freedom of communication or expression. Within our legal system, communications are free only to the extent that they are left unburdened by laws that comply with the Constitution. 108 To see what significance this statement might have for free-standing rights, one must unscramble the contrast being drawn here. First of all, this statement somewhat misleadingly indicates that the United States Constitution 'contains' an 'express right of freedom of communication or expression'. The United States Constitution does contain an 'express' freedom of speech provision, but it contains no express 'right'. What it contains, literally, is a prohibition of action by Congress which would 'abridge' the freedom: 'Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.' 109 That is, the relevant language of the United States Constitution contains an express restriction on legislative power, 110 and that is precisely the way the Lange _____________________________________________________________________________________ 106 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560 ('personal rights'), 560 ('personal right'), 575 ('private right'), 567 ('private rights'); Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 148-9 ('personal freedom'), 145, 147, 148, 162 ('personal right'), 153 ('rights of individuals') (Brennan J), 195 ('private right') (McHugh J). 107 See Stone, above n 6. Dr Stone argues that the term 'personal rights', as used by the Court, purports to limit the implied constitutional freedom of communication for various reasons -because the freedom is restricted in scope, because it excludes protection of individual autonomy, and because it has no application to the common law; but, she argues, none of these limiting attributes are consistent with the basic freedom that the High Court has recognised. 108 (1997) 111 Secondly, it is true that the American First Amendment 'has been interpreted to confer private rights.' But, as we have just seen, that cannot be explained directly as a consequence of an express constitutional right, since no such express right exists. On the contrary, the interpretation which confers rights is based on an express constitutional freedom restricting legislative power; and that is parallel to the implied Australian freedom restricting legislative power. Of course, there are obvious and strong arguments against implying a freedom of communication from a text which, unlike the United States Constitution, contains no express references to a speech liberty or freedom; 112 but Lange proceeds on the assumption that the implied freedom exists. If an acknowledged freedom can be interpreted as a source of right, there is no good reason why that cannot be true simply because the freedom is implied.
Thirdly, contrasting the operation of the United States Constitution, the Court says 'communications', in Australia, 'are free only to the extent that they are left unburdened by laws that comply with the Constitution.' 113 By necessary implication (despite the misleading 'only'), communications are also free in Australia when they are burdened by laws that do not comply with the Constitution. That is, speech is free in Australia when 'burdened by laws' that violate Australia's constitutional 'restriction on legislative power' under the test laid down in the Lange judgment and subsequently applied in other cases. 114 Both consequences exactly describe the operation of the American First Amendment: Communications within the freedom of speech (and the derivative private right) are free 'to the extent that they are left unburdened by laws that comply with the Constitution' and they are free when they are burdened by laws that do not comply.
Even if a contrast between American personal rights and Australian restrictions on legislative power could be convincingly shown, the significance of the distinction is elusive. In his Theophanous dissent, Brennan J quoted from his ACTV judgment, saying, as to a personal right, 'the scope … must be ascertained in order to discover what is left for legislative regulation.' He contrasted that to a freedom of a kind that was 'an immunity consequent on a limitation of legislative power.' 115 If the freedom to discuss government were understood to be a personal freedom, it would be open to the Court to define it in qualified or limited terms … But if the freedom to discuss government be the consequence of a limitation on power, the issue … is whether the laws of defamation, in their application to the facts … are valid. 116 The real difference in this distinction is not easy to see. In either case, the Court must make a determination whether the law would be unconstitutional as applied to particular facts on the basis of the Court's judgment about the effect of the implied freedom on the exercise of an otherwise valid legislative power.
A clue to the Court's concern might be taken from the wide-ranging debate among constitutional scholars concerning the difference between rights characterised as 'vertical' and 'horizontal.' 117 A fundamental right is vertical if it is limited to a right of an individual against the state. A fundamental right is horizontal if it also provides a cause of action on the basis of which a private individual can sue another private individual or entity. In an isolated statement in the Theophanous plurality judgment, Mason CJ and Toohey and Gaudron JJ said, '[t]his approach [of NY Times] does not limit the protection to protection against government conduct.' 118 This might have suggested, misleadingly, that the American and Theophanous approach was committing Australia to the adoption of a horizontal rights theory. Accordingly, the Lange Court's strong opposition to 'personal rights', might be understood to be a rejection of the horizontal rights concept.
In context, however, it was clear that the plurality judgment was merely concurring with the American position in NY Times that judicial enforcement of defamation laws, whether common law or statutory, was action by the 'state'. Under the American 'state action' doctrine, individual rights are protected only against action of the 'state' -ie, the action of federal, state, or local government. 119 This, of course, means free speech rights in the United States are firmly limited to the vertical side of the horizontalvertical divide. 120 Thus, the constitutional jurisprudence in both Australia and the United States has opted for the vertical conception of rights and freedoms. Recognising that the freedom of political communication applies directly to the common law does not change that in the United States. The position the High Court had adopted in its Theophanous judgment would not have changed it in Australia. In short, the basis for a contrast between American personal rights and the Australian limitation on legislative power cannot be found in the distinction between vertical and horizontal rights. 121
III BACKING INTO THE FUTURE
None of the several comparisons with American constitutional law in the Lange Essay provides a really satisfactory explanation for the rejection of the Theophanous (and American) approach in favour of the Lange approach -or, more precisely, an explanation that demonstrates the importance of the change of approach. If we return to the genesis of the Lange Essay on the 'common law and the Constitution', it will be recalled that the Essay entailed an undertaking to 'consider the relationship between the Constitution and the freedom of communication which it requires on the one hand and the common law and the statute law which govern the law of defamation on the other.' 122 The High Court placed its consideration in the framework of the evolution from English to Australian constitutional law. In doing so, the High Court pointed out the difference between the treatment of the common law under Australian and American constitutional federalism. Under the American fragmented common law, each state has its own common law and the United States Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to determine what the common law of the states is. As a consequence, as the High Court observed, Australian but not American constitutional law permits the highest court under the national Constitution to develop the common law to bring it into accord with the Constitution. But that distinction did not require a rejection of the American approach adopted in significantly, it did so in the words of Sir Owen Dixon. Plainly, the High Court was drawing strength into its Essay from Dixon's immense stature. 123 It seems appropriate, therefore, to place the Essay's use of Dixon's words in the broader context of his work through which the Court was considering the common law, federalism, and parliamentary sovereignty. In this way, I will treat the Essay as an invitation to take Dixon's words as a guide to extend the Australian-American comparison concerning political communications. The Lange Essay does not juxtapose parliamentary sovereignty and American constitutional law, but Sir Owen Dixon did so.
A Federalism and parliamentary sovereignty 1
Sir Owen Dixon on the Common Law and Parliamentary Sovereignty in Australia and the United States. The Lange Essay twice refers to the connection between the common law and parliamentary sovereignty. 124 One of these references, emphasising the common law source of parliamentary sovereignty, also presents a theme that is repeated in Sir Owen Dixon's extrajudicial scholarship: the 'conception of the complete supremacy of Parliament', Sir Owen said, may be considered as deriving its authority from the common law rather than giving authority to the common law. But, after all, the common law was the common law of England. It was not a law of nations. It developed no general doctrine that all legislatures by their very nature were supreme over the law. 125 This theme, that parliamentary sovereignty was not a law of nature, but a product of the common law of England, was a critical part of Sir Owen's reasoning as a Justice of the High Court in his very important judgment 126 in the Trethowan Case. 127 The theme was repeated in several Dixon lectures. 128 In a long and complex lecture delivered in 1935, 'The law and the Constitution', 129 Dixon discusses the tension between three conceptions -the supremacy of law, the supremacy of the Crown, and the supremacy of parliament -and their reconciliation in British constitutional theory. 130 He noted the lack of attention 'given to the manner in which the idea of legislative sovereignty has operated to modify the conception of the supremacy of the law.' 131 Wherever the common law has gone, the theory of the supremacy of the law has necessarily gone with it. But the theory of legislative sovereignty stands in a different position. Its transfer to lands outside Britain was less easy. For the common law, being The supremacy 'over the law' was a unique feature of the Parliament at Westminister. Legislatures were created outside England through the authority of the common law.
But at common law such a legislature was not supreme over the law. Its powers were limited by the law. Those limitations might arise from the express terms of the instrument creating it … from [a territorial restriction,] from a legal doctrine, somewhat vague and obscure, that none of its enactments should be repugnant to the basal principles of the common law. 133 If the legislature attempted to go beyond these limitations, 'its enactment would be simply nugatory and void.' 134 Sir Owen said that 'the fundamental idea of the supremacy of the law was rooted in the common law.' 135 He observed that 'British parliamentary sovereignty' was 'renounced' by the American constitutional system, which elevated 'the conception of the supremacy of the law.' 136 It is of the essence of parliamentary sovereignty that the courts of law, once there is put before them an authentic expression of the legislative will, shall give unquestioned effect to it according to what appears its true scope and intent. But it is of the essence of the supremacy of the law that the courts shall disregard as unauthorized and void the acts of any organ of government, whether legislative or administrative, which exceed the limits of the power that organ derives from the law. This was the constitutional position of the thirteen American colonies when they declared their independence. Their revolt was against the supremacy of the British Parliament. The Declaration of Independence, therefore, might be thought to imply the transfer of that supremacy to their own legislatures. 137 But such a view was inconsistent with republican principles which included the doctrine that the ultimate source of governmental power was in the governed. 138 Despite the fascination and influence of American federalism on the framers of the Australian Constitution, according to Dixon, 139 [U]ntil lawyers became accustomed to the working of a federal system, the conception of parliamentary supremacy over the law dominated their thoughts. The rival conception of the supremacy of the law over the legislature is the foundation of federalism. Under that system, men quickly depart from the tacit assumption to which a unitary system is apt to lead that an Act of Parliament is from its very nature conclusive. They become accustomed to question the existence of power and to examine the legality of its exercise. Nothing has had so profound an influence upon legal ideas in this country as the establishment of the federal constitution -the greatest event in our political and legal development. The [Commonwealth legislative] power is ancillary or incidental to sustaining and carrying on government. Moreover, it is government under the Constitution and that is an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect, as, for example, in separating the judicial power from other functions of government, others of which are simply assumed. Among these I think that it may fairly be said that the rule of law forms an assumption.
The federalist basis of this reasoning is, of course, a text-and-structure-based reading of a rigid constitution.
The 'profound … influence' of a federal constitution in Australia had prevented the abridgement of political speech before Lange - no power to pass a law to suppress or punish political criticism') (Latham CJ, dictum); at 116-8 (reading facts not to support conviction under criminal sedition statute because words of defendant on which the conviction was based were 'not expressive of an intention to effect' the 'purpose of exciting disaffection') (Dixon J, dissenting). Despite an evenly divided High Court in Burns, the conviction was affirmed by the casting vote of that case, the Court was faced with a statute enacted to facilitate the celebration of Australia's Bicentennial, the 200 th anniversary of British ships sailing into Sydney Harbour. As part of this statutory scheme, a Bicentennial Authority was created and given a monopoly over a number of common words, such as 'Australia' or 'Sydney' in conjunction with '1788'. These words could not be used without the Bicentennial Authority's permission, and the Authority withheld permission from certain Aboriginal groups that wanted to raise questions about the unqualified beneficence of the advent of white settlement on the Australian continent. As considered by the Court, the issue was whether the Commonwealth Parliament and the Executive had been granted power under ss 51(xxxix) and 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution to enact this aspect of the legislation. The Court determined that this power did not exist, and there is no doubt that its determination was decisively influenced by the judgment that the legislation undermined the 'fundamental value' of freedom of expression, 146 as Mason CJ later called it in his Nationwide News judgment. Davis, in short, is a federalism decision critically spiced with a free speech flavour.
Under the usual principles of federalism, a challenged statute must be sufficiently related as a means of exercising one of the specified national powers. 147 The courts in Australia (like those in the United States) would ordinarily take a deferential approach to the legislature and answer the question in favour of the power if there was a reasonable (or, perhaps, even plausible) interpretation that would produce that result. In exceptional cases, when special values -like free expression -are adversely affected, deference goes down and the possibility that the existence of Commonwealth legislative power will be found wanting is greatly enhanced -as occurred in the Davis case. 148 In Nationwide News, three concurring Justices based their judgments on the [I]n determining whether that requirement of reasonable proportionality is satisfied, it is material to ascertain whether, and to what extent, the law goes beyond what is reasonably necessary or conceivably desirable for the achievement of the legitimate object sought to be attained and, in so doing, causes adverse consequences unrelated to the achievement of that object. In particular, it is material to ascertain whether those adverse consequences result in any infringement of fundamental values traditionally protected by the common law, such as freedom of expression. 150 Under the Australian -and American -pattern of federalism, however, the States ordinarily have the legislative power not assigned to the national government. The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution expressly provides that 'powers not delegated' to the national government are 'reserved to the states'. 151 
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Volume 34 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Of course, the Australian Colonies had -as their successor States now havesubject matter power to legislate, in general, concerning the law of defamation. But that is not the question. In Davis, by analogy, the High Court did not question the broad power of the Commonwealth to legislate concerning the Centennial celebration; it was only the particular application of that power in its impact on freedom of speech that was ultra vires. Similarly, the concurring Justices in Nationwide News did not question the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate on the subject of industrial relations or for the protection of the Industrial Relations Commission; it was only a particular application of that power that was not within ss 51(xxxv) and 51(xxxix). As a Justice of the High Court, Sir Owen Dixon made a similar distinction concerning a State's residual ('continuing') power. Dixon did not question the general power of the States to legislate concerning the winding up of an insolvent company. But, in dissent in Uther's Case 155 and for the High Court in Cigamatic, 156 he concluded that a State lacked power to subordinate Commonwealth claims to those of other creditors. Section 107 was irrelevant, he said. 'The Colony of New South Wales could not be said at the establishment of the Commonwealth to have any power at all with reference to the Commonwealth.' 157 What is critical is not the correctness of the Cigamatic principle, 158 but only the concept that a State, no less than the Commonwealth, may exceed its acknowledged general legislative power in the context of a particular application. 159 In sum, starting with the Communist Party and Davis cases, there was an alternative theory for protecting political speech as an internal or intrinsic limitation of legislative power -a limitation, in the words of the Lange Essay, resulting from a 'federal system of government embodied in a written and rigid constitution.' 160 In Sir Owen Dixon's words, ' [t]he rival conception of the supremacy of the law over the legislature is the foundation of federalism.' 161 The rationale actually adopted for protecting political speech has been understood to be based on an external or extrinsic limitation coming from outside legislative powers. 162 This actual rationale, too, might be explained, speculatively, in Dixon's words: The Australian judiciary, having 'become accustomed to question the existence of power and to examine the legality of its exercise', 163 applied its ingrained judicial independence beyond its federalist wellspring to find, in a different text and structure of the Australian Constitution, an implied limit on all legislative power (national or State) that would impermissibly interfere with the freedom of political communication. 164 In fact, the line separating intrinsic and extrinsic limits on legislative power is often very thin. 165 Plainly, simultaneous intrinsic limits on both national and State legislative power look very much like an extrinsic limit. Plainly, too, once one knows that there is an extrinsic limit, it follows that an otherwise available legislative power cannot be validly used in a way that the extrinsic limit prohibits. The Australian (though not the American) Constitution underlines this point by qualifying all heads of national legislative power with the limiting phrase, 'subject to this constitution.' 166 The characterisation of the freedom of political communication as a 'restriction on legislative power' 167 
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The common law and constitutional methodology Although the constitutional freedom of political communication is described in the Lange Essay as a 'restriction on legislative power', the Essay's heading concentrates our attention on the relationship between '[t]he common law and the Constitution' and the common law is put in a separate category. So, the shift from Theophanous to Lange might seem to be a shift from the Constitution to the common law and might seem to be a turning away from confronting the limits of 'a federal system of government embodied in a written and rigid constitution' 169 and to relieve the Court of the need, learned from federalism according to Sir Owen Dixon, 'to question the existence of power and to examine the legality of its exercise. Common law is amenable to development by judicial decision, subject to the Constitution and to statute. What is permissible development of the common law by the courts and what amounts to impermissible change is an issue on which minds differ most sharply. 172 Justice Brennan then lists several considerations that a court may take into account and concludes:
[I]t is clear that judicial development of the common law is a function different from the judicial interpretation of statutes and of the Constitution. In the development of the common law, judicial policy has a role to perform …; in the interpretation of statutes, judicial policy is alien to the task of exegesis. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 168 Ibid 564 (emphasis added). 169 Ibid 562. 170 Jesting Pilate, above n 9, 44. 171 Zines, above n 34, 227 ('tone more than substance that seemed to presage a new more legalistic attitude'). 172 182 CLR 104, 142 (Brennan J, dissenting) In the interpretation of the Constitution, judicial policy has no role to play … [I]n the interpretation of the Constitution judicial policy provides no leeway for judgment as it does when the Court is developing the common law. 173 The following is a statement in Lange explaining how it was that the English common law of defamation had changed since 1901 when the Commonwealth Constitution took effect:
Since 1901, the common law -now the common law of Australia -has had to be developed in response to changing conditions. The expansion of the franchise, the increase in literacy, the growth of modern political structures operating at both federal and State levels and the modern development in mass communications, especially the electronic media, now demand the striking of a different balance from that which was struck in 1901… The factors which affect the development of the common law equally affect the scope of the freedom which is constitutionally required. 'T]he common convenience and welfare of society' is the criterion of the protection given to communications by the common law of qualified privilege. Similarly, the content of the freedom to discuss government and political matters must be ascertained according to what is for the common convenience and welfare of society. That requires an examination of changing circumstances and the need to strike a balance in those circumstances between absolute freedom of discussion of government and politics and the reasonable protection of the persons who may be involved, directly or incidentally, in the activities of government or politics. 174 So, according to the Theophanous dissent, 'judicial policy has a role to perform' in interpreting the common law, but '[i]n interpreting the Constitution, judicial policy has no role to play'. 175 Yet, in Lange, the same factors determine the common law and constitutional law; the 'common convenience and welfare of society' is the criterion which governs both the common law and the Constitution, and both the common law and the Constitution require 'an examination of changing circumstances and the need to strike a balance in those circumstances…'. 176 According to the Theophanous dissent, the Court lacks the power to 'develop' constitutional law; 177 yet, where the Lange judgment refers to 'the factors which affect the development of the common law', it says that those factors 'equally affect the scope of the freedom which is constitutionally required.' 178 When the same factors determine legal results, any difference between characterising the process in terms of affecting 'development' and affecting 'scope' appears to be trivial.
The Theophanous dissent said that constitutional interpretation by the Court cannot be influenced by what the Court 'perceives to be desirable policy' 179 and in interpreting the Constitution 'judicial policy provides no leeway for judgment as it does when the Court is developing the Common law.' 180 When the factors which the Court listed in Lange -'expansion of the franchise, the increase in literacy, the growth of modern political structures operating at both federal and State levels and the modern development in mass communications, especially the electronic media' 181 -determine the scope of the implied freedom, that is not a mechanical reading of the constitutional text. They are factors which the Court, in its judgment, concludes are changing circumstances relevant to determining what the constitutional freedom should be understood to mean.
To be sure, the dissent in Theophanous recognised that 'changing conditions' have a 'changing effect.' 182 And, keeping in mind that the Theophanous dissent was a dissent, the contrast may appear to be more of a continuum than a change. 183 Still, the Court in Lange was unanimous and the dissenter in Theophanous was now the Chief Justice and part of that unanimity; no doubt an important part. The judicial function in constitutional interpretation contemplated by Lange and its merging with the judicial function in interpreting the common law counters the possible impression of retrenchment that one might otherwise attribute to the Lange decision's focus on the common law.
2 The Common Law and the Common Law Methodology. If attention is concentrated on the fact that the High Court has judicial power to define and develop the common law, the difference between Australian and American constitutional law is highlighted. That contrast is in the forefront of the Lange judgment. But when attention is focused on the substance of the common law methodology which may guide the constitutional interpretation (and simultaneously control the common law), a very different picture emerges.
Writing about the High Court's constitutional work in the '2002 Term', Justice Susan Kenny 184 concluded that 'the common law constitutional method took priority over other interpretive approaches.' 185 Citing the work of American scholars, 186 Kenny J described this approach (which she also calls 'doctrinal') as depending 'on the claim that principles may be derived from the Court's previous authorities relevant to the resolution of the constitutional question at hand.' 187 According to Kenny J, the virtues of the common law approach to constitutional law 'are largely the virtues of the common law. In interpreting the constitutional text by reference to prior authorities, the Court promotes the values of continuity, stability, and predictability.' 188 At the same time, Kenny J points out, 'the common law constitutional method' does not 'necessarily promote rigidity, or an unimaginative application of the decisions of the past to the questions of the present … [T]he method permits the evolution of constitutional principle, although on a gradual or incremental basis …'. 189 One of the cases specifically relied upon by Kenny J to elaborate this method was Roberts v Bass, 190 in which various members of the Court applied Lange to resolve the question whether, under the facts and in the procedural setting of Roberts v Bass, the freedom of political communication required the common law of defamation to provide the 'extended form of qualified privilege' adopted in Lange. 191 The Justices were clearly focused on the constitutional question, and they were clearly applying a common law methodology. For example, the joint judgment of Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ, explores what the common law qualified privilege entailed, 192 points out that Lange did not exhaust 'the constitutional freedom's impact on the law of defamation,' 193 and describes in detail why the relevant 'circumstances' 194 required that the common law be developed to avoid unconstitutional chilling of political speech under Lange's governing test. 195 Prior to Roberts v Bass, the common law methodology had been applied by the High Court in Levy, 196 and by Kirby J's dissenting judgment in Lenah Game Meats, 197 decided in 2001 between Lange and Roberts v Bass. 198 In Levy, the Court rejected the freedom of political communication argument, but it had no difficulty applying its precedents to a novel setting (in Australian constitutional law) to recognise that symbolic expression was an important means of communicating political ideas and that the concern about the treatment of animals was an important political issue. In Lenah Game Meats (also involving animal welfare), in connection with a novel and rejected invasion of privacy claim, Kirby J argued that there was a prima facie privacy claim that would support the issuance of an interlocutory injunction, but concluded after a thorough consideration of the competing interests that the freedom of political communication foreclosed enjoining the broadcast of confidential information. 199 202 in rejecting the political communication argument, used a common law methodology in comparing and distinguishing prior cases involving the freedom of political communication. 203 The common law methodology is evolutionary, and the details of what is covered and what is protected are worked out only over a long period of time. As the Court said in Lange, 'the content of the freedom to discuss government and political matters … requires an examination of changing circumstances and the need to strike a balance in those circumstances between absolute freedom of discussion of government and politics and the reasonable protection' of those who are affected by the discussion. 204 And as new problems arise, the existing doctrine must be brought to bear on the problem at hand. Speaking of the constitutional defence to a defamation action in Roberts v Bass, Callinan J said, '[i]t will take years, years of uncertainty and diverse opinion for the Court to reach a settled view of the elements of the defence and the way in which it is to be applied. Lange certainly does not exhaustively define its impact on the law of defamation.' 205 Certainly, Lange does not exhaustively define its impact, as Callinan J observed, and the timeline he described may actually be too short. In its nature, the common law methodology is evolutionary and endless.
3 Common Law, Text and Structure, and Alexander Meiklejohn. As the preceding discussion of cases indicates, Kenny J's recognition of the importance of the common law methodology in a particular year of High Court decisions does not suggest that that methodology was limited to that year. Plainly, for both Australian and American constitutional law, that has been one of the models for explaining what the courts do and should do in deciding constitutional issues. 206 Moreover, it is clear from Kenny J's analysis that the common law constitutional methodology is in no way inconsistent with the Lange Court's emphasis on 'text and structure.' 207 On the contrary, the common law methodology describes a means of interpreting the constitutional text and structure. 208 Indeed, once it is clear that the common law must accord with the Constitution and that constitutional interpretation may follow a common law methodology, Lange's limitation to 'text and structure' loses its surface appearance of being narrow and restrictive.
The primary text to be applied, as spelled out in Lange, is found in sections 7, 24, and 128 of the Constitution, giving the people the right to vote for Senators, Representatives, and constitutional amendments. These provisions, in turn, are supplemented by the many other textual provisions, also listed in the Lange judgment, 209 which are all woven together into a structure which creates the system of representative and responsible government providing the foundation for the freedom of political communication. 210 The Court said pointedly in Lange, 'the relevant question is not, "What is required by representative and responsible government?" It is, "What do the terms and structure of the Constitution prohibit, authorise or require?"'. 211 But the ultimate question remains: In what respects and to what extent do the text and structure protect representative government by protecting the freedom to communicate concerning political matters? The answer will not be found in a dictionary but through the exercise of judicial judgment. 212 It is commonplace that freedom of expression owes its lofty position in many different constitutional systems to the important values and interests it furthers, both as a means of producing benefit to society and as an end in itself for individual human beings. In addition to the interest in furthering democratic government, extensive protection of free speech is justified on the ground that it is an instrumental means of discovering truth and that it furthers the intrinsic values of self-realisation and individual autonomy. 213 The absence of an open-textured provision like 'freedom of expression' necessarily circumscribes any basis in Australian constitutional law for giving significance to the recognised speech values linked to the discovery of truth or to individual achievement of self-realisation or autonomy. 214 But the express textual sources and related structure of the Australian Constitution emphatically provide a basis for constitutionalising free speech protection that furthers the value of representative government. 215 Despite its limitation to furthering only this one free speech value, the implied freedom of political communication is potentially very broad. This potential breadth of the constitutionally protected freedom has been underlined in cases decided since Lange despite a changing High Court. 216 The High Court's recent decision in Coleman v Power 217 well illustrates the elusiveness and the potential breadth of the freedom of communication that is protected to further the interest of Australian representative government based on the text and structure of the Australian Constitution. Coleman was convicted for using insulting words -specifically for the statement, '[t]his is constable Brendan Power, a corrupt police officer.' 218 A divided Court indicated that this speech was constitutionally protected under the implied freedom. 219 Chief Justice Gleeson, noting that the appellant's conduct was 'not party political' nor concerned with 'laws, or government policy' and that 'reconciling freedom of political expression with the reasonable requirements of public order becomes increasingly difficult when one is operating at the margins of the term "political"', concluded that the speech could be prohibited under Lange to further the public order. 220 Justices Callinan 221 and Heydon 222 agreed. In separate judgments, McHugh J, 223 Gummow and Hayne JJ together, 224 and Kirby J, 225 all concluded that the defendant's statement was a political communication within the protected freedom.
In the text of the United States Constitution, general 'freedom of speech' language makes it is easy to argue, and for the courts to conclude (as they have), that all of the possible free speech values are embraced by the constitutional wording. Against this open-ended language, Alexander Meiklejohn argued that the purpose of 'free speech' under the United States Constitution was not to further private interests, like selffulfillment, but should be limited to its role of furthering 'self-government.' 226 Clearly, in American constitutional law, Meiklejohn lost this part of the debate. In a convoluted way, one might say that Meiklejohn won the debate in Australia. By necessity, because the value of free speech in furthering self-government is the only thing -the very thing -which the text and structure of the Australian Constitution engender, Australia's constitutionally protected freedom of communication is limited to that one free speech value. That is the value that Meiklejohn regarded as the heart and soul of free speech.
IV CONCLUSION
It is important to remind myself and to remind my readers that I am an American writing about Australian constitutional law. At one level, this is a comparative study, but it is also primarily a study about Australian constitutional law and about a particular case decided by the High Court of Australia. It is, specifically, a study of an Australian constitutional law decision that has drawn upon American constitutional law because of what the two constitutional systems share, but share with a difference.
It has been my intention to take seriously and to respond to the High Court's analysis which assumes a relevant Australian-American interrelatedness. The unanimous Lange decision continues to be the leading case explaining Australia's implied freedom of political communication. 227 At the centre of that explanation was the High Court's focus, for Australia and the United States, on the necessity of accommodating 'basic common law concepts and techniques to a federal system of government embodied in a written and rigid constitution.' 228 In the words of Sir Owen Dixon, 'the supremacy of the law was rooted in the common law' and the 'conception of the supremacy of the law over the legislature is the foundation of federalism.' 229 At the very bull's eye of the Lange Court's explanation was the Court's discussion of the difference between the accommodation of the common law and federalism through the 'fragmented' American and the unified Australian Constitutions. 230 The Australian-American difference in this respect provided part of the Court's reasoning for not using the American approach that had been adopted in Theophanous. But the significance of the shift from Theophanous to Lange seems relatively modest; and the High Court's attention to American constitutional law invites a broader consideration of the similarities and differences of American and Australian protection of freedom of political expression.
Overriding Australian-American differences, each of the two Constitutions has a text-based reason for protecting speech which furthers representative government. Within their shared commitment to protect free speech which is political, Australia and the United States share major freedom of speech territory.
Australia also shares with the United States a tradition of developing constitutional law through a common law methodology. A common law constitutional methodology commits a court to treating its own precedents as a dynamic source of law, sensitive to changing circumstances made known to the court over time. The end product of a common law constitutional line of development is further development. Although the line of growth will be circumscribed by Lange's determination that representative democracy must be limited to that which can be derived from the constitutional text and structure, the broad scope and variety of communications affecting political matters described in Lange and elaborated in other cases demonstrate that that limitation need not be unduly constraining.
The constitutional common law methodology does not entail a commitment to any particular substantive vision of freedom of political communication -certainly not to the peculiar substantive view into which Meiklejohn's thesis took him, 231 nor to any specific doctrines of American constitutional law. As the High Court made clear from the beginning, Australia will forge its own view of what the freedom of political communication requires. The constitutional jurisprudence that will further that value
